Would the West Defend Taiwan? Public Opinion Across Five NATO Countries

Study description

This report is based on data from the longitudinal investigation of public views on collective defense commitments during the second Trump presidential administration (see “Public Support for Collective Defense in NATO during the Second Trump Administration: A Longitudinal Study” and “NATO’s Collective Defense Credibility during the Second Trump Administration: A Longitudinal Study in Russia”). Our primary aim in this project is to test whether Trump’s rhetoric and approach to alliance management lead to discernible shifts in public perceptions of and support for collective defense commitments in NATO.

In our first report, we examined how public views on NATO’s collective defense commitments shifted between January 2025 and March 2025 in five NATO countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Poland, and Germany. In our second report, we showed corresponding dynamics on data from a survey of the Russian population.

In this third report, we focus on a single policy-relevant issue identified in our March 2025 survey: public support for defending Taiwan from China’s invasion and perception of the credibility of Western military assistance in this scenario. We provide results from a cross-national survey in five NATO countries – the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Poland, and Germany – a compare these attitudes with those towards a hypothetical conflict with Russia on NATO’s eastern flank.

Data collection procedure

In the first survey round in January 2025, we used the Prolific online platform to collect data from five NATO countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Poland, and Germany). In the United States and the United Kingdom, we opted for the “representative sample” option provided by this service. In the remaining three countries, we set quotas for gender. Eligible participants were at least 18 years old and had an approval rate of 95% or higher on Prolific, with a history of completing between 5 and 2000 studies on the platform. We included all participants who completed the study in our analysis. In the second survey round in March 2025, we fielded the survey to an identical sample of respondents. In this report, we only report findings from this follow-up March 2025 survey.

Sample size

  • United States: 538

  • United Kingdom: 573

  • Germany: 753

  • Poland: 688

  • Canada: 702

Data analysis

Below, find categorical plots showing percentages of respondents who selected the given response. To allow easier interpretation, we aggregated the responses made on a nine - point scale into three categories (Opposed, Neither opposed nor supportive, Supportive; or Unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, Likely).

Results

(1) Cross-national Differences in Support for Defending Taiwan (TW) and Latvia (LV)

Summary of Results:

Cross-national Variation in Support for Defending Taiwan: The data reveal significant differences in public attitudes toward defending Taiwan across countries. In North America, majorities of Americans (58%) and Canadians (60%) support deploying their country’s armed forces to defend Taiwan. However, support drops sharply in Europe, with only 36% of Britons, 34% of Germans, and just 25% of Poles in favor.

Comparison of Support for Defending Taiwan and Latvia: When comparing public support for defending Taiwan and Latvia, we observe consistently stronger support for defending Latvia across all surveyed countries. Nearly three-quarters of respondents (on average) support sending their country’s armed forces to defend Latvia, while roughly two-fifths support defending Taiwan.

Particular National Differences: Among Americans, the difference in support for defending Latvia (64%) and Taiwan (58%) is relatively small. However, in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Poland, support for defending Latvia is roughly double that for Taiwan. Canada is a partial exception, with consistently high levels of support for deploying their country’s armed forces to defend both Taiwan and Latvia.

Survey Questions: The plot on the next page presents responses to two survey questions on public support for defending Latvia and Taiwan. The exact wording of the questions is as follows:

·       Support for Defending Latvia: If Russia and Latvia were at war, would you be supportive of or opposed to your country sending its armed forces to defend Latvia?

·       Support for Defending Taiwan: If China and Taiwan were at war, would you be supportive of or opposed to your country sending its armed forces to defend Taiwan?

Survey Results

(2) Cross-National Differences in Perceived Credibility of U.S. Defense Commitments to Taiwan (TW) and Latvia (LV)

Summary of results:

Cross-national Variation in the Perceived Likelihood of the U.S. Defending Taiwan: In the early months of the second Trump administration, perceptions of the credibility of U.S. defense commitments to Taiwan were low across all five surveyed countries. On average, only 41% of respondents believed the U.S. would defend Taiwan. Among the countries surveyed, Canadians were the most skeptical, with only 32% believing the U.S. would defend Taiwan, followed by the British (37%), Germans (39%), Polish (48%), and Americans (50%).

Comparison of the Perceived Likelihood of the U.S. Defending Taiwan and Latvia: While there are notable differences across countries in support for sending armed forces to defend Taiwan versus Latvia, the perceived credibility of U.S. defense commitments remains largely consistent. The only exception is Germany, where respondents saw the U.S. as slightly more likely to defend Latvia (45%) than Taiwan (39%). In all other countries, respondents saw no difference in the likelihood of the U.S. honoring its commitments to either country.

Survey Questions: The plot on the next page presents responses to two survey questions regarding public perceptions of the credibility of U.S. defense commitments to Latvia and Taiwan. The exact wording of the questions is as follows:

·       Perceived Likelihood of U.S. Defending Latvia: Latvia is a NATO member state located in Eastern Europe. Imagine that Russia and Latvia are at war. If this occurred, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the United States would send its armed forces to defend Latvia?

·       Perceived Likelihood of U.S. Defending Taiwan: Taiwan is a country located in East Asia. Imagine that China and Taiwan are at war. If this occurred, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the United States would send its armed forces to defend Taiwan?

Survey Results

(3) U.S. Partisan Divides on Support for and Perceived Likelihood of Defending Taiwan

Summary of results:

The plots below show responses from U.S. participants in the March 2025 survey, focusing on support for and perceived likelihood of the United States defending Taiwan, broken down by party affiliation: Republican, Independent, and Democrat. Democrats were the most supportive of defending Taiwan, with 64% in favor, compared to 57% of Republicans and 54% of Independents. However, Democrats were also the most doubtful about U.S. military action—only 31% believed the U.S. would actually defend Taiwan, versus 69% of Republicans and 50% of Independents. These differences likely reflect Democrats’ skepticism toward the Republican administration’s willingness to uphold U.S. commitments abroad, while for Republicans, the gap between higher expectations and lower support may suggest isolationist tendencies.

U.S. Partisan Differences in Support for Defending Taiwan

U.S. Partisan Differences in Perceived Credibility of Defense Commitments to Taiwan

Updated on April 14, 2025

Written by: Michal Smetana, Lauren Sukin, Marek Vranka and Ondřej Rosendorf